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Restoring the Character Evidence
Rule: Reconsidering Evidence of
Crimes, Wrongs, and Other Acts in
Rhode Island
Edward Pare III*
INTRODUCTION

The American criminal justice system rests on the
fundamental notion that criminal actions, not criminal character,
warrant criminal punishment.1 American courts are not to render
verdicts based on whether an individual is a bad person or
whether an individual has a propensity for criminal behavior.2
Rather, the system convicts on proof of the crime alleged.3 Yet,
this bedrock principle has been remolded and chiseled down in
recent years to the point that this once well-settled exclusion now
serves as more of an exception rather than the rule.4
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2016.
1. See Michelson v. United States, 355 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) (“Courts . . .
almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any
kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of
his guilt.”).
2. See, e.g., People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930)
(explaining that this principle underlies criminal justice through the general
policy of excluding evidence of prior wrongs because, if “propensity may be
proved against a defendant as one of the tokens of his guilt, a rule of criminal
evidence, long believed to be of fundamental importance for the protection of
the innocent must be first declared away”).
3. See United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[O]ur
system of criminal justice focuses solely on the commission of specific
forbidden acts, rather than the punishment of those persons who have a
criminal or evil character.”).
4. See Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American
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In Huddleston v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court chiseled away at that fundamental bedrock by remolding
the character evidence rule.5 In Huddleston, the Court adopted
an inclusionary approach to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
holding that evidence of prior wrongs is admissible under the rule
if offered for a permitted purpose, provided that the evidence
passes a Rule 403 balancing test.6 Furthermore, the Court held
that, when proof of the prior wrong is offered for a permissible
purpose, a trial judge need only find that the jury “could
reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the
evidence.”7 The Court reasoned that the procedural protections
that lie within the Federal Rules of Evidence were sufficient to
protect a defendant from undue prejudice.8
However, since Huddleston, states have remained free to
implement their own standards of admissibility for evidence of
crimes, wrongs, and other acts.9 Each state, in accordance with
its own rules of evidence, has the independent authority to craft a
substantive standard of admissibility on top of the procedural
Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L. REV. 775, 776–77 (2013); 1B CIPES, BERNSTEIN &
HALL, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 26A.01[3]-15 (Matthew Bender, rev.
ed., 2012).
5. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
6. Id. at 687–88. Such permitted purposes include, but are not strictly
limited to, “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” FED. R. EVID.
404(b)(2).
7. Id. at 690. A trial court itself need not find that the government has
proved the conditional fact, but only that the jury could reasonably make
such a finding. Id.
8. Id. at 691–92. For example, the Court concluded, based on a review
of Rule 404(b)’s legislative history, that a trial court will subject prior wrongs
evidence to a Rule 403 balancing test to determine “whether the danger of
undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” Id. at 688
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note). But, the Court
acknowledged Congress’s intention that the balancing test should be
conducted with an eye towards admissibility. See id. at 688–89. The Court
found that Congress was more concerned with “ensuring that restrictions
would not be placed on the admission of [Rule 404(b)] evidence” than with the
potential prejudice to the defendant. Id.
9. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 541 So. 2d 801, 814 (La. 1989) (holding that
evidence of other bad acts must be “clear and convincing” to gain
admissibility); Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
(en banc) (rejecting the Huddleston preponderance standard of admissibility
and holding that “the proper quantum of proof in establishing that the
defendant committed the extraneous offense is beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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safeguards that already exist within its own rules of evidence.10
Rhode Island is no exception.11 Yet, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court fully adopted the Huddleston approach to evidence of
crimes, wrongs, and other acts in State v. Rodriguez.12 In doing
so, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted a new approach to
its once-exclusionary rule regarding such evidence.13
This Comment will argue that the procedural protections
endorsed in Huddleston are not adequate to safeguard against
improper admission of evidence of prior wrongs. As we reconsider
the way courts handle crime and punishment, it is also time to
reconsider the fundamental promise of Rule 404(b)’s original
exclusionary approach to evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, and
other acts. While the potential for undue prejudice is certainly an
important interest served by Rule 404(b), the greater, more
practical concern lies with the potential erosion of a defendant’s
presumption of innocence.14 As such, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court should reconsider its adoption of Huddleston’s inclusionary
approach to Rule 404(b) evidence, and instead require “clear and
convincing” proof of evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts as
a prerequisite to admissibility.
Part I explains how the United States Supreme Court came to
adopt the Huddleston standard, exploring arguments offered from
the United States and the defendant. This Comment will also
explore how the procedural protections the Court endorsed in
Huddleston are inadequate when compared to the consequences of
admitting evidence of prior bad acts. Part II explains the Rhode
Island Supreme Court’s adoption of the Huddleston approach to
Rhode Island’s Rule 404(b) and how its adoption strays from the
promises and purposes that once formed the underpinning of the
rule excluding character evidence. In Part III, by framing the
discussion around the context of current discourse regarding the
criminal justice system, this Comment will examine the

10. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(a) (describing the binding applicability of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to federal courts).
11. See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 151 n.9 (R.I. 2010) (noting that
the Rhode Island Supreme Court is “not bound by the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of its rules of evidence.”).
12. See id. at 151–52.
13. See id. at 154 (Robinson, J., concurring).
14. See Milich, supra at note 4, at 797–99.
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unintended consequences associated with remolding Rule 404(b)
as an inclusionary rule. Finally, this Comment concludes by
offering a clear, bright-line solution: Rhode Island should adopt a
“clear and convincing” standard of admissibility for 404(b)
evidence.
I.

THE HUDDLESTON STANDARD

In 1985, Guy Huddleston was convicted of selling and
possessing stolen videocassette tapes in interstate commerce.15
Mr. Huddleston’s conviction not only left him imprisoned, but it
also left a lasting legacy for the interpretation of the admissibility
of crimes, wrongs, or other acts.16 The singular focus of Mr.
Huddleston’s trial was whether he knew the tapes were stolen; if
so, he was certainly guilty of possessing and selling them in
interstate commerce.17 In order to show that Mr. Huddleston had
the requisite knowledge, the government made a motion in limine
to introduce evidence of Mr. Huddleston’s similar bad acts under
Rule 404(b).18 The district court admitted evidence of two specific
prior bad acts: First, the testimony of Mr. Paul Toney, a record
store owner, to whom Mr. Huddleston had allegedly offered to sell
stolen television sets; and, second, testimony from “an undercover
FBI agent posing as a buyer for an appliance store” to whom Mr.
Huddleston had offered to sell “hot” goods.19
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit initially reversed, suppressing
Mr. Toney’s testimony about Mr. Huddleston’s offer to sell him
stolen televisions.20 The Sixth Circuit held that the prosecution
15. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988).
16. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire”:
Should the Judge or the Jury Decide the Question of Whether the Accused
Committed an Alleged Uncharged Crime Proffered Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404?, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 813, 816–17 (1998).
17. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 683.
18. United States v. Huddleston, 802 F.2d 874, 875 (6th Cir. 1986), rev’d
on reh’g, 811 F.2d 974 (1987).
19. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 683. Specifically, an agent for the FBI
testified that Mr. Huddleston offered to sell him 10,000 VHS tapes, indicating
that some of the tapes were “hot.” Brief for the United States, Huddleston,
485 U.S. 681 (No. 87-6), 1988 WL 1031752 at *6. Mr. Huddleston testified in
rebuttal that he had told the agent that all of the items he offered to sell
“were not hot.” Brief for Petitioner, Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (No. 87-6),
1987 WL 881126 at *10.
20. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 684.
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failed to present “clear and convincing evidence that the television
sets [at issue] were stolen.”21 However, upon rehearing, the Sixth
Circuit issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court’s
admission of Mr. Toney’s testimony, and held that the
government’s burden to introduce the similar acts was by a
preponderance of the evidence.22 This split within the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals over the standard of admissibility for
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts mirrored a similar split
among the other circuit courts of appeals.23 The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari to hear Mr. Huddleston’s
appeal to resolve whether Rule 404(b) requires clear and
convincing proof of other bad acts, or whether proof that such bad
acts occurred requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.24
In this landmark decision, the Court held that while the text
of Rule 404(b)’s contains no explicit standard of admissibility for
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts, the admission of such
evidence hinges on conditional relevance.25 As such, the standard
21. See id.
22. See id. The Sixth Circuit explained:
[I]n light of the recent decision of another panel of this court in
United States v. Ebens . . .we now conclude that the clear and
convincing evidence standard does not govern the admissibility of
“similar acts” evidence sought to be admitted under [Rule] 404(b).
Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard adopted in
Ebens, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of the similar acts in question here.
United States v. Huddleston, 811 F.2d 974, 975 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(citations omitted).
23. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686 n.2. The Court summarized the
split amongst the circuits:
The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits allow the admission
of similar act evidence if the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to
find that the defendant committed the act. Consistent with the
Sixth Circuit, the Second Circuit prohibits the introduction of similar
act evidence unless the trial court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant committed the act. The Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits require the
Government to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant committed the similar act.
Id. (citations omitted).
24. See id. at 685 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 484 U.S. 894
(1987)).
25. See id. at 689. This discrete procedural decision is the primary cause
of the erosion of Rule 404(b)’s promise to preserve each defendant’s
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of admissibility requires only that a jury could reasonably find
that the other act occurred by a preponderance of evidence.26 The
Court reasoned that procedural mechanisms built into the Federal
Rules of Evidence were sufficient to safeguard against the
introduction of “unduly prejudicial evidence,” and laid out the
procedural protections within the Rules as follows:
[T]he protection against such unfair prejudice emanates
not from a requirement of a preliminary finding by the
trial court, but rather from four other sources: first, from
the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be
offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy
requirement of Rule 402—as enforced through Rule
104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must
make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative
value of the similar acts evidence is substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and
fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which
provides that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct
the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered
only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.27
This decision was fatal to Mr. Huddleston’s appeal for relief, and
precluded a heightened, clear and convincing standard of
admissibility for evidence introduced under Rule 404(b).28
As for Mr. Huddleston’s particular situation, the Court
affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, holding that because a jury
could have reasonably found that the televisions were stolen when
Mr. Huddleston possessed and sold them, the evidence was
properly admitted.29 On a much larger scale, this decision
resolved a circuit split in holding that the standard for admitting
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad act is merely a trial court’s
determination that a reasonable jury could find that the a prior
bad act occurred by a mere preponderance of the evidence.30

presumption of innocence before a jury. See infra Parts II & III.
26. See id. at 689–90.
27. Id. at 691–92 (citations omitted).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 692.
30. Id. at 690.
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II. RHODE ISLAND’S RULE 404(B)

A. Crafting a Rule for Evidence of Crimes, Wrongs, and Other
Acts
Before 1987, Rhode Island law was generally opposed to the
use of specific instances of an accused’s prior bad acts in criminal
cases.31 As the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted in 1896,
“[p]articular acts or instances of misconduct cannot be proved; nor
rumors and reports. . .”32 Thus began the inquiry: when is
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts admissible, and exactly
how much proof is needed to show that the act occurred?
The Rhode Island Supreme Court squarely addressed the
issue of when evidence of an individual’s prior wrongs is
admissible in State v. Colangelo.33 In Colangelo, the Court upheld
the admission of the defendant’s prior immoral sexual conduct,
which the government had used to support the defendant’s
conviction for being a “common cheat.”34 The defendant had been
proselytizing, referring to himself as the “Nazarene Christ,” and
used this identity to solicit money by invoking his powers to cure
illness, preach, and sell various knickknacks.35 At trial, the
government presented evidence that the defendant had primarily
directed his efforts toward women, whom he had conned into
“giv[ing] him either gratuitous service or [supplying] him with
31. See Heather E. Marsden, Note, State v. Hopkins: The Stripping of
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) Protections from Accused Sexual
Offenders, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 333, 333 n.4 (1998) (“Before Rhode
Island enacted evidentiary Rule 404(b), the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
followed a similar common-law rule.”) (citing State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526,
531–32 (R.I. 1978)).
32. Folwell v. Providence Journal Co., 37 A. 6, 8 (R.I. 1896) (emphasis
added) (quoting 3 J. G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §
1226 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1893)). While Folwell’s proposition came in a
libel case, the notion rings true for any specific instance of prior misconduct:
there is an inherent difficulty in proving them. Cf. R.I. R. EVID. 405 advisory
committee’s note (“[J]ust when a specific act has some bearing on the case is
an everchanging concept.”). While the method of proof for evidence of prior
bad acts is not the subject of this article, the governing law is surely a close
cousin of the question presented about the standard of admissibility for Rule
404(b) evidence. See id. The issue of when evidence of prior misconduct is
admissible is closely related to how that evidence is proved. See id.
33. 179 A. 147 (R.I. 1935).
34. Id. at 149.
35. Id. at 148.
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funds to meet his living expenses and financial obligations.”36 The
government put forth evidence of the defendant’s prior “immoral
sexual conduct toward females who were under his protection in
care,” to bolster the proof that the defendant had the requisite bad
intent to make false representations.37
The Rhode Island
Supreme Court upheld the presentation of evidence to the jury
because the conduct was inextricably “connected with . . . [his]
scheme to deceive and defraud.”38 The court also recited its
general rule “that in the trial of a criminal offense evidence of
other and distinct criminal acts is generally prejudicial and
inadmissible,” and exceptions to this rule should be “invoked with
caution.”39 Given the ample proof presented and the special
relevance to the charged offense, the defendant’s prior wrong was
not protected by the rule of exclusion because it was offered “to
establish guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, scheme,
system, or the like.”40
This formulation served as the basis for the Rhode Island’s
treatment of evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts. As the
Rhode Island Supreme Court summarized in State v. Sepe:
It is a generally accepted rule that evidence indicative of
a bad character or a criminal disposition on the part of a
defendant is inadmissible to prove the likelihood that he
committed a particular offense.
These authorities
nevertheless recognized certain exceptions to the general
rule. Although these exceptions cannot be stated with
categorical precision, evidence of other conduct, even if
criminal, is competent to prove the specific crime charged
36. Id.
37. Id. at 149.
38. Id. The court explained how the evidence was relevant to whether
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense:
Any evidence which showed that, during the very period when he
was making [representations that he had spiritual healing powers]
and in the very house in which he was practicing what he claimed to
be divine healing, he was also engaged in immoral sexual conduct
toward females who were under his protection and care, was
admissible as strongly tending to prove that, when he made these
representations, he knew them to be false and that he was acting in
bad faith.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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when it tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the
absence of mistake, (4) a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
related to each other that proof of one tends to establish
the others, or (5) the identity of the person charged with
the commission of the crime on trial.41
Therefore, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court undertook an
effort to codify its rules of evidence, Rhode Island caselaw reveals
that the common-law rule regarding prior bad acts was considered
a “general rule of exclusion.”42
B. Codifying the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence
In 1987, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence, in keeping with a nationwide movement
on the part of states to codify uniform rules of evidence.43 Rhode
Island’s Rule 404(b) now provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to
prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and
that the fear was reasonable.44
Rule 404(b)’s advisory committee notes explain that “Rhode
Island law provide[s] for certain exceptions to this general rule of
exclusion.”45 As such, during “the trial of a criminal offense
‘evidence of other and distinct criminal acts is generally
prejudicial and inadmissible.’”46 Rhode Island courts have since
41. 410 A.2d 127, 130 (R.I. 1980) (citations omitted).
42. State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 720 (R.I. 1985).
43. Mia Ruscetta, The Tangled Web of Other Bad Acts, 49 R.I. B.J. 11, 11
(June 2001). The Rhode Island General Assembly subsequently adopted the
Rhode Island Supreme Court’s proposed rules of evidence, and the rules took
effect on October 1, 1987. 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 381, § 1 (codified as
amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-42 (1987)).
44. R.I. R. EVID. 404(b).
45. ERIC D. GREEN & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE
MANUAL § 404.02, at 96 (2005 ed.) (emphasis added).
46. Id. (quoting State v. Ryan, 321 A.2d 92, 95 (R.I. 1974)).
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supplemented Rule 404(b)’s permissible uses with two judicially
crafted exceptions: the complete story and lewd disposition
doctrines.47
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s adoption of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence did not mark a sea of change in the
judiciary’s approach towards its evidentiary framework. In fact,
within Eric D. Green’s Analysis of Changes in Rhode Island Law
of Evidence Under Draft Proposed Rules, any mention of an analog
of Federal Rule 404(b) was noticeably absent.48 The permissible
inference is that Rhode Island, in codifying its Rules of Evidence,
did not alter the rule for when evidence of prior crimes, wrongs,
and other bad acts is admissible.49 Thus, Rhode Island’s adoption
of a set of evidentiary rules simply codified the existing caselaw
surrounding evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts. Rhode
Island’s exclusionary approach to such evidence, coupled with the
caselaw’s strong cautionary approach towards admitting such
evidence, was still good law at the time of Rhode Island’s
codification of its Rules of Evidence. Still, Rhode Island—even
after enacting its Rule 404(b), drafting advisory committee notes,
and developing pre-codification caselaw on the subject—had yet to
set a bright-line, substantive standard for the admissibility of
evidence pertaining to a defendant’s prior bad acts.
C. Rhode Island Adopts the Huddleston Approach
Two recent cases reveal that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has attempted to suppress confusion surrounding admissibility of
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts.50 However, the court
resolved this confusion in favor of an approach not supported in its
precedent. First, in State v. Gaspar, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court overturned a trial court’s decision to admit Rule 404(b)
evidence by way of Rule 403.51 In Gaspar, the State of Rhode
Island prosecuted the defendant for first-degree sexual assault.52
47. Ruscetta, supra note 43, at 11.
48. See Eric D. Green, Annotation, Analysis of Changes in Rhode Island
Law of Evidence Under Draft Proposed Rules, R.I. CT. R. ANN. 990, 990
(1985).
49. See id.
50. See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145 (R.I. 2010); State v. Gaspar, 982
A.2d 140 (R.I. 2009).
51. Gaspar, 982 A.2d at 147.
52. Id. at 145. The defendant faced six counts of first-degree sexual
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The facts revealed at trial were sexually explicit in nature.53 The
defendant’s first trial on this matter ended with a jury deadlock,
and resulted in a mistrial.54 His second trial resulted in his
conviction on five of six counts of first-degree sexual assault.55 On
appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the government’s
presentation of testimony from the defendant’s former sexual
partner, was inadmissible under Rule 404(b).56 However, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to address the defendant’s
argument directly, and instead applied Rule 403, finding that the
likelihood that the sexually graphic testimony would “confuse the
jury and invite an emotional response” outweighed its probative
value.57 The court declined to discuss whether the evidence had
been properly admitted under Rule 404(b) because the nature of
the evidence necessitated suppression under Rule 403.58 Notably,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, for the first time, cited with
approval the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation in
Huddleston, which set the stage for a more formal adoption of its
reasoning.59
One year later, in State v. Rodriguez, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court formally adopted the Huddleston approach to Rule
404(b).60 The court recited the familiar procedure for considering
the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence when challenged on
assault—one for each sexual act performed on the victim on the night of the
alleged encounter. Id.
53. See id. at 142–45.
54. Id. at 145.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 145–46.
57. Id. at 147, 149.
58. Id. at 145.
59. See id. at 148. The court endorsed Huddleston and noted that R.I. R.
EVID. 403 provides a procedural safeguard against the admission of 404(b)
evidence:
Rule 403 cuts across the rules of evidence and is always a
consideration in a trial justice’s ruling on the admissibility of Rule
404(b) evidence. . . . Similar approaches have been endorsed by the
federal courts applying the substantially analogous Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 404(b).
Id. See also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988) (noting
that evidence properly offered under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) “is
subject only to general strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules 402 and
403”)).
60. 996 A.2d 145, 151–52 (R.I. 2010).
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appeal.61 First, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must be
offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b).62 This procedural
protection is installed within the rules of evidence to prevent the
introduction of other-act evidence for the purpose of establishing
someone’s propensity to act in kind.”63
The Rhode Island
Supreme Court then formally adopted the Huddleston approach:
First, a trial justice may exclude evidence of a prior act
under Rule 104(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence
if she concludes that the jury could not reasonably find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the prior act
occurred. Second, a trial justice may exclude evidence
under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence if
she finds that its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. Lastly,
a trial justice must, upon the request of counsel, issue a
cautionary instruction to the jury reminding it not to
consider the evidence for propensity purposes.64
In doing so, the court implicitly concluded that these procedural
protections were sufficient to guard “against admitting unfairly
prejudicial prior bad acts evidence.”65
The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on a strict reading of
Rule 404(b) to adopt the Huddleston approach to evidence of prior
bad acts.66 After parsing the language of Rhode Island Rule of
Evidence 404(b), the court determined that the rule’s “exceptions”
indicated that the rule is one of inclusion, not exclusion. Although
the court had previously described the rule’s opening sentence—
that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person
acted in conformity therewith”67—serves as its “‘general
61. See id.
62. See id. at 150–52.
63. See id.; R.I. R. EVID. 404(b). Just as the United States Supreme
Court held in Huddleston, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the
proper purpose requirement stands as the first guard against inappropriate
admission of prior misconduct evidence. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691
(1988); Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151.
64. Id. at 151–52 (citations omitted) (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689–
91).
65. See id. at 151.
66. See id. at 150–51.
67. Id. at 150 & n.7 (quoting R.I. R. EVID. 404(b)).
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exclusionary’”68 provision, Rule 404(b)’s second sentence—that
“such evidence may be ‘admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or accident. . .’”69—plainly conveys
an inclusionary approach to such evidence.70 The court reasoned
that the rule is one of exclusion only when such evidence is offered
for propensity purposes, but when evidence is offered for a
permitted purpose—i.e., any purpose other than “to prove that the
accused has a criminal disposition and, therefore, is more likely to
have committed the crime for which he stands accused”—the rule
morphs into one of inclusion.71 In other words, “the second
sentence in Rule 404(b) is . . . a simple reiteration of the broad
admissibility principles that undergird our rules of evidence.”72
While the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not frame it as
such, the inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b)’s second sentence
marks a change in Rhode Island’s evidentiary framework. As
Justice Robinson pointed out in his concurrence, “it is inaccurate
to state that our rules of evidence are undergirded by ‘broad
admissibility principles.’”73 Justice Robinson disagreed with the
court’s “implication that this Court should interpret Rule 404(b) as
a rule of inclusion.”74 In fact, not only did Justice Robinson not
find that the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were based upon the
principles of “broad admissibility,” he also did not “locate an
opinion from [the court] which characterizes the rule in that
manner.”75 Rather, he explained, “several opinions of [the court]
clearly indicate that Rule 404(b) should be viewed as a rule of
exclusion.”76 As Justice Robinson made clear, Rodriguez turned
Rhode Island’s traditionally exclusionary approach to Rule 404(b)
on its head.77
68. Id. (quoting State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 148 (R.I. 2009)).
69. Id. (quoting R.I. R. EVID. 404(b)).
70. Id. at 150–51.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 151.
73. Id. at 154 (Robinson, J. concurring) (quoting majority opinion).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (collecting cases).
77. See id. at 154–56. Justice Robinson further explained that the court
has historically treated evidence of prior wrongs as “presumptively
inadmissible.” Id. (citing State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 316 (R.I. 1997).
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III. THE TROUBLE WITH HUDDLESTON AND RODRIGUEZ

The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s newly adopted
inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b)—even when applied to only
a single sentence of the rule—directly conflicts with the rule’s
underlying purposes.78 It has been argued that three policies
justify Rhode Island’s Rule 404(b): (1) “to prevent jurors from
unjustly convicting a defendant based on their presumptive belief
that the accused is a bad person”; (2) “to prevent jurors from
convicting a defendant based on their belief that the prior bad acts
indicate an ongoing propensity in the accused to commit the
charged crime”; and, (3) because “admit[ting] prior uncharged
misconduct evidence may impose an unreasonable burden on the
defendant.”79 However, one scholar raised a loftier goal that Rule
404(b) aims to serve.80 Instead of focusing on the propensity
inference, to which a jury may assign improper weight, Professor
Paul Milich argues that the better justification for Rule 404(b) is
to preserve the presumption of innocence for all defendants who
stand accused of a crime.81 The crux of this argument is that Rule
404(b) ensures that every defendant—the sinner and the saint
alike—is equally entitled to the same presumption of innocence.82
This is indeed the most significant promise underpinning Rule
404(b): regardless of what prior acts trail a defendant as he enters
the courthouse, he approaches the jury with a presumption of
innocence.83
Framing Rule 404(b) as an evidentiary rule that guarantees
the presumption of innocence challenges Rodriguez’s adoption of
Huddleston. When considering the admission of Rule 404(b)
evidence in light of undue prejudice alone, the procedural
safeguards may seem adequate.84 For example, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court vigorously applied Rule 403’s balancing test to

78. See Marsden, supra note 33, at 340–42.
79. Id. at 341–42.
80. See Milich, supra note 4, at 791–97.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 795.
83. See id. at 795–96. Rule 404(b) is not so much concerned with a jury’s
overvaluation of prior bad acts as it is with requiring a jury “to give the
benefit of the doubt and then some to a fellow citizen who stands in jeopardy
of tasting the state’s awesome power to take away that citizen’s liberty.” Id.
84. See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 151–52 (R.I. 2010).
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suppress evidence in Gaspar.85
However, the court’s
reconstruction of Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion conflicts with
the more persuasive rationale underlying the rule—the
presumption of innocence.86 When a Rhode Island trial court
applies Rodriguez’s inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b), it
considers the evidence with an eye towards “broad admissibility
principles.”87 This umbrella of broad admissibility allows for
evidence, previously scrutinized and disfavored in Rhode Island,
to begin its “lubricated” path towards admission.88
The first problem with Huddleston lies within its lack of
substantive protections at the outset of the Rule 404(b) inquiry.
In Huddleston, the Court denied the defendant’s argument that
the trial court should make a preliminary finding as to whether
the government proved the occurrence of the prior bad act before
determining whether the government had articulated a permitted
purpose for the evidence under Rule 404(b).89 The Court’s
decision to deny a preliminary finding under Rule 104(a), and
instead couching that finding under Rule 104(b), allows the flow of
Rule 404(b) evidence into trial courts, thus stripping away Rule
404(b)’s protection. Rather than requiring a preliminary finding
of admissibility prior to the Rule 404(b) proper purpose
determination, the Court placed the trial court’s decision too far
along the procedural framework of the rules of evidence. Each of
these rules build procedural, or mechanical, protections against
admitting potentially prejudicial evidence; however, substantive
protection, at the outset of the introduction of prior bad acts
evidence, is warranted to adhere to Rule 404(b)’s purposes.
Rhode Island’s adoption of this approach is equally

85. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147–48 (R.I. 2009).
86. See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 155 (Robinson, J., concurring); see also
Milich, supra note 4, at 794–96.
87. See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151 (majority opinion).
88. See Milich, supra note 4, at 780.
89. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1988). The
defendant in Huddleston argued for the same type of threshold inquiry put
forth in this Article: that “[a]s a prerequisite to admitting misconduct
evidence under 404(b), the government must prove the misconduct by clear
and convincing evidence.” Brief for Petitioner, Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681
(1988) (No. 87-6) at *31. While the defendant in Huddleston offered three
other solutions, the clear and convincing requirement is most persuasive
here. See id. at *30–31.
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inadequate.90 First, the stage at which a trial court determines
whether the government has proven the occurrence of the crime,
wrong, or other bad act by a preponderance of the evidence
happens after the trial court has begun the move towards
admissibility.91 The trial court undertakes this analysis after
finding that the evidence has been offered for a permitted purpose,
and after it has determined that the evidence is relevant under
Rule 402.92 Again, this is all beneath the umbrella of “broad
admissibility principles,” which significantly alters the traditional
approach to Rule 404(b) evidence.93 Under this umbrella, the trial
court may be unable to treat the evidence with as much caution or
subject it to as careful a weighing process as once before.94 Thus,
all that is left for the trial court to substantively determine is
whether Rule 104(b)’s conditional relevance requirement has been
met.95 In other words, the occurrence of the prior bad act—i.e.,
the fact underlying the conditional relevance inquiry—is subjected
to a mere preponderance of the evidence standard.96
The
relevance of the evidence relies only upon the determination that
a jury could reasonably find that it is more likely than not that the
defendant committed the prior crime, wrong, or other act.97 This
places evidence that is inherently and unfairly prejudicial, upon
the scales of justice for a fifty-fifty balancing test.
The preponderance standard for admissibility is too low at
this stage of the trial court’s Huddleston inquiry. The approach
lends itself to far too much discretion at the trial court level.98
Furthermore, the inquiry essentially becomes subjective: The
90. See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151–52 (“[A] trial justice may exclude
evidence of a prior act under Rule 104(b) . . . if she concludes that the jury
could not reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the act
occurred.”) (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 153–54 (Robinson, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 154 (regarding “evidence of prior wrongs [as] presumptively
inadmissible”).
95. See id. at 151–52 (majority opinion) (citing Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988)).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Milich, supra note 4, at 790 (“[T]he character rule . . . has been
getting clobbered in our courts. This has been easy to accomplish where the
rule poorly constrains and so much is left to the barely controlled discretion of
the trial judge.”).
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trial court considers the purported similar act in light of all of
evidence presented, and determines whether, in the eyes of a
reasonable jury, there is enough evidence to tip the scale towards
admissibility.99
Now, in light of the umbrella “inclusion”
approach, the hurdle over which the evidence must climb has
already been lowered substantially.100 To add to this, the mere
preponderance of proof standard further greases the wheels of the
evidentiary inquiry towards admissibility. This increases the
chance for unpredictable case-by-case determinations dependent
upon the trial court judge’s sole discretion as to whether there is
just enough evidence to tip the scale.101 Especially in close cases,
such a fifty-fifty inquiry seems too light when considering the
drastic effect such evidence may have on a defendant’s
presumption of innocence in the minds of jurors. Leaving the
introduction of evidence that is widely considered inflammatory
and infectious up to a coin flip is not the type of protection
envisioned by Rule 404(b). The Rodriguez approach in Rhode
Island has couched any substantive protection of Rule 404(b)’s
promise too far along the route of admissibility. The timing of this
inquiry is too late, and the standard for admissibility is too low.
Second, the procedural safeguards within the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence should serve more as a backstop for substantive
protection from the admission of crimes, wrongs, and other bad
acts rather than as the frontline protection. The procedural dams
endorsed in Rodriguez—Rule 104(b)’s conditional relevance
requirement, Rule 403’s balancing test, and a Rule 105 limiting
instruction—should act as fallback protections against which a
trial court examines the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence.102
This is consistent with the original intent and approach behind
Rule 404(b): a general approach of exclusion.103 While Rule 403’s
99. See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151–52 (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at
690).
100. See id. at 154 (Robinson, J., concurring).
101. See Lisa Marshall, Note, The Character of Discrimination Law: The
Incompatibility of Rule 404 and Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE
L.J. 1063, 1092 (2005) (“[T]he unarticulated exception to the propensity ban
leaves courts confused over its outer boundaries . . . .”); see also Milich, supra
note 4, at 790.
102. See id.
103. See GREEN & FLANDERS, supra note 48, § 404.02 (characterizing Rule
404(b) as a “general rule of exclusion”). But see State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713,
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balancing test is perhaps the best justification for the Rodriguez
approach to Rule 404(b),104 it still proves insufficient when the
defendant’s presumption of innocence is at stake.
As one
commenter explained:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston will
effectually ease the burden for the proponent of other-acts
evidence. The burden is on the opponent of the evidence
to convince the court that the danger of admitting the
evidence “substantially outweighs” its probative value.
This is an onerous burden for the opponent of the
evidence. The opponent’s burden of overcoming Rule 403,
the inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b), and Rule
104(b)’s liberal standard for proving that the defendant
committed the extrinsic act will combine to ease the task
of getting other-acts evidence admitted at trial.105
This is yet another concern with the inclusionary approach to
Rule 404(b)—it infects the way each of the procedural protections
are purported to work.106 This becomes all the more antithetical
to Rule 404(b)’s promise to protect the presumption of innocence
when one considers how a defendant can reasonably defend that
presumption when the jury hears evidence of his or her other
crimes, wrongs, and bad acts. What sort of case can the defendant
put on to push back against Rule 403’s weighing test, which is
“substantially” tilted against him or her?107 Furthermore, in
720 (R.I. 1985) (placing this “general rule of exclusion” in the context of a
non-exhaustive list of exceptions).
104. See GREEN & FLANDERS, supra note 48, § 403.02 (“In Rhode Island,
the trial judge has the traditional discretion to exclude logically relevant
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial.”).
105. Jane C. Hofmeyer, Case Note, A Relaxed Standard of Proof for Rule
404(b) Evidence: United States v. Huddleston, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 79, 91 (1989)
(citations omitted). While Hofmeyer agrees with the Court’s approach in
Huddleston, her outline of the way Rule 403 works in conjunction with the
admission of 404(b) evidence is on point here.
106. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687–91 (1988). The
other admissibility considerations—relevance under Rule 402, sufficient
factual basis under Rule 104(b), and avoidance of unfair prejudice under Rule
403— are colored by the trial court’s proneness to admissibility. See id. The
same is true with the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s holding in State v.
Rodriguez. 996 A.2d at 151–52.
107. See CIPES ET AL., supra note 4, § 26A.01[3]. Furthermore, this may
raise constitutional questions as to the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to
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cases where the prior bad act is not so egregious, Rule 403 is
unlikely to bar the evidence.108 For example, the introduction of a
defendant’s prior nonviolent drug offense would not likely
substantially outweigh the probative value of that evidence.109
Thus, Rule 403 proves inadequate to keep these types of crimes
from sullying a defendant’s presumption of innocence. Moreover,
courts should not even engage in these mini-trials centered on the
underlying fact on which conditional relevance hinges.110
The final procedural protection endorsed in Rodriguez is a
Rule 105 limiting instruction.111 There has been much debate as
to whether such limiting instructions, particularly those directed
towards Rule 404(b) evidence, are all that effective.112 Then,
there is the ultimate decision of whether a trial court judge will
issue a limiting instruction at all.113 Again, there is still a real
concern that the adoption of an inclusionary approach to Rule
404(b) has damaged each these procedural protections along the
route towards admissibility.
Rodriguez couches protection too far along the road to
admissibility, which, when coupled with the potential for
unpredictable, case-by-case determinations as to whether the
government has carried its burden of proof, signals that the
procedural safeguards, without more, are inadequate. These
avoid self-incrimination as well as his Sixth Amendment right to confront his
accused. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
108. See R.I. R. EVID. 403; see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 742 (R.I.
1994).
109. See R.I. R. EVID. 403.
110. Time saved should not outweigh the potential for time served;
administrative convenience in avoiding mini-trials over character evidence
ought to tilt towards the presumption of innocence.
111. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 152.
112. See Nicole M. Priolo, Topical Survey, Can A Curative Instruction
Effectively Remedy Impermissible References to A Defendant’s Past Criminal
Behavior?—State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206 (R.I. 1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 583, 588 (1997) (explaining that the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
overturning a conviction based on the lack of effectiveness of the trial court’s
limiting instruction in the face of admission of character evidence “weakens
the strength of the curative instruction”); see also David Alan Sklansky,
Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 408–09
(2013).
113. In Rhode Island, this question is answered depending on the nature
of the crime charged. See, e.g., Ruscetta, supra note 43, at 49–50 (explaining
the different treatment in Rhode Island of sexual offenses and non-sexual
offenses with respect to Rule 105 instructions).

PARE FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2016 10:39 PM

418 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:399
procedural safeguards are especially inadequate in light of Rule
404(b)’s promise that each defendant is entitled to a presumption
of innocence. Therefore, substantive protection installed at the
outset of the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence is required.
IV. THE SOLUTION: SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION

The allure to use other acts evidence lies in its ability to fill in
gaps where the prosecution would otherwise need traditional
evidence.114 Prior bad acts evidence plants the bad seed of the
defendant’s character into the mind of the jury, allowing the jury
to fertilize the prosecution’s theory of the case by filling in small
holes along the way. But the entire point behind Rule 404(b) is to
act as a filter, to protect the case from that kind of improper
exposure.115 In this way, procedural protection has proven
inadequate.116 It is as if the protection of the rules evaporates
once evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other bad acts comes into play.
The defendant faces extensive litigation over each procedural
dam, while simultaneously unable to rely on any realistic
substantive protection. Counsel for the defendant is also faced
with a Hobson’s choice as the trial proceeds: call attention to the
evidence in closing argument, or let it linger hoping that the seed
has not yet planted in the mind of the jury. Without a substantive
stopgap, the defendant’s presumption of innocence is left entirely
to a balancing act: does the evidence tend to show that the
defendant engaged in prior misconduct by a preponderance of the
evidence?117
The Rhode Island Supreme Court should adopt a more
substantive protection against the inherent threat to just verdicts
posed by evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts. The court
can do so by making the standard of admissibility a threshold
issue for Rule 404(b) evidence.118 Rather than continue to follow
the Huddleston approach and couch a preponderance of the
evidence showing within Rule 104(b), the court can make
114. See Milich, supra note 4, at 782–84.
115. See State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1053 (R.I. 2000).
116. See supra Part III.
117. See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 151–52 (R.I. 2010).
118. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at *30–31, Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681 (No. 87-6) (listing various approaches to admissibility of Rule
404(b) evidence).

PARE FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2016 10:39 PM

2016] RESTORING THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULE

419

admissibility a threshold issue and require a trial justice to make
an initial factual finding under Rule 104(a).119 Furthermore, the
court should raise the standard to require a finding of clear and
convincing proof of the defendant’s crime, wrong, or other bad
act.120 Substantive protection, by way of a clear and convincing
standard of admissibility at the outset of the government’s
introduction of 404(b) evidence, coupled with the Rodriguez’s
procedural protections, best serves the promises at the heart of
Rule 404(b).121
This approach best affirms the promise that each defendant
in a criminal case, who “starts his life afresh when he stands
before a jury, a prisoner at the bar,” is indeed presumed
innocent.122 As Justice Robinson articulated in Rodriguez, Rhode
Island has a long-standing, well-established approach to regard
Rule 404(b) as a general rule of exclusion.123 In fact, Justice
Robinson also argued to make the Rule 404(b) a threshold inquiry,
by first installing a presumption against admissibility and second
placing the burden of admissibility onto the evidence’s
proponent.124 This is precisely in keeping with the need for
substantive protection before the procedural mechanism of
Rodriguez and Huddleston engage and the wheels towards
admissibility are greased.
Requiring clear and convincing proof of evidence of a
defendant’s crime, wrong, or other bad act would also alleviate the
concerns with case-by-case determinations as to which evidence
will come in and which will not.125
As this standard of
119. See id.
120. See id. Before Huddleston, “[t]his test [was] followed by the Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.” Id. at *30.
121. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151–52.
122. See People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
123. See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 154 (Robinson, J., concurring) (“I have yet
to locate an opinion from this Court which characterizes the rule [as a rule of
inclusion]—whereas several opinions of this Court clearly indicate that Rule
404(b) should be viewed as a rule of exclusion.”).
124. Id. at 150–52 (majority opinion) (stating that the court should
“expressly recognize that there is (1) a rebuttable presumption against the
admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence and (2) a principle that the proponent of
Rule 404(b) evidence bears the burden of establishing its admissibility.”)
(footnote omitted).
125. See id. at 150–52. By adopting a broad inclusionary approach to the
latter sentence of Rhode Island’s Rule 404(b), the Rhode Island Supreme
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admissibility is stricter than that of a showing by a preponderance
of the evidence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s application of
its standard of review for reversible error is reduced. This brightline rule would help eliminate unpredictable trial court rulings on
admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, especially in close cases. A
bright-line, upfront rule for admissibility would also avoid
potential missteps along the path of various interlocking
procedural safeguards in the rules of evidence.
Rather than focus on the intangible concern of a jury’s undue
prejudice and overemphasis on evidence of crimes, wrongs, and
other acts, the Rhode Island Supreme Court can place a
substantive roadblock on the frontline of such evidence’s
admissibility. In keeping with the underlying promise and
purposes of Rule 404(b), Rhode Island’s courts should serve as
gatekeepers against admission of evidence of crimes, wrongs, and
other acts. Only when evidence of a defendant’s crimes, wrongs,
and other acts are proven by clear and convincing evidence and
admitted for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) should it gain
admission to the sanctum of the jury’s deliberations. Together,
substantive and procedural protections equally respect
fundamental fairness and the presumption of innocence for each
defendant who approaches the jury, “a prisoner at the bar.”126
The greatest power of Rule 404(b) evidence lies within its
ability to sprinkle seeds of doubt against the defendant’s
presumed innocence. Courts can prevent juror-mind-wandering
and gap-filling as to whether the defendant has a guilty past, and
focus them on whether the defendant is guilty based on the facts
presently before the jury. This is best achieved with a substantive
measure of protection—a bright-line, predictable standard of
admissibility for evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or
acts.
CONCLUSION

Re-invigorated by the study of mass incarceration, legal
scholars, jurists, prosecutors, defense counsel, and others alike

Court forgoes the benefits that a clear and convincing standard offers when
determining admissibility of evidence and omits necessary protections to the
defendant. See id.
126. See People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).

PARE FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2016 10:39 PM

2016] RESTORING THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULE

421

have begun to reconsider the ways in which the criminal justice
system ought to work. In light of this conversation about the
merits of crime and punishment, the time is now due to reaffirm
substantive protection against character evidence. As explained
above, the procedural filters the Court endorsed in Huddleston,
and which Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted in Rodriguez, are
insufficient. Substantive protection in the form of clear and
convincing evidence is necessary. Evidence of a defendant’s
crimes, wrongs, and other acts measured against a clear and
convincing standard of admissibility best adheres to the
exclusionary purpose to Rule 404(b). The Rhode Island Supreme
Court has the power to right this wrong.
This is not a question of a wayward, activist judicial
imposition onto the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rather, it is
a question of fundamental fairness and presumption of innocence,
read together with the inherent purpose of the rule: to bar
evidence of an individual’s characteristic to prove he acted in
conformity therewith at the time of the charged offense. Rule
404(b) ought to be treated as an exclusionary rule because it was
designed as one. Reading the rule as one of exclusion promotes
fundamental fairness, giving an accused individual and his
counsel a direct opportunity to challenge evidence before the
inevitable flow of prior misconduct evidence flows forthwith.
Rather than reciting the protection of procedural dams, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court can provide substantive protection to
charged individuals facing admission of evidence of crimes,
wrongs, and other acts. Ensuring substantive protection by
adopting a standard of evidence that requires clear and convincing
proof of an individual’s prior bad acts would help move the
criminal justice system towards a more perfect system—one that
convicts in the right way for the right reasons.
Raising an evidentiary standard of admissibility may be a
small solution, but it strives to restore two bedrock values of the
criminal justice system: fundamental fairness and the
presumption of innocence. The way to do this is to provide more
protection, not less. In the absence of legislative action, the court
can re-sculpt Rule 404(b) to layer substantive protection on top of
the procedural blocks already in place. It is time to reconsider
Huddleston/Rodriguez and restore the character evidence rule in
Rhode Island.

